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DuANE L. ISHAm*
The question has often arisen in Ohio as to whether words
used by the defendant are libelous per se or libelous per quo. The
answer to this question is important because of the view Ohio
courts have taken regarding libel actions, particularly in regard to
the requirement of special damages.
In England and in many American courts all libelous words
are actionable per se, i.e., it is not necessary for the plaintiff to
prove special damages, malice, or falsity, all these being presumed
from the speaking of the words.' Not all slander, however, is action-
able per se. Unless the words charge the plaintiff with an indictable
offense (involving moral turpitude or infamous punishment), a
loathsome disease, or are calculated to injure him in his trade or
profession, he must show the words caused him specific, pecuniary
loss in order to recover.2 Thus there are many words actionable
per se if written which require allegation and proof of special
damages if merely spoken.
All courts make a distinction between written words which are
clearly defamatory on their face and those which are ambiguous,
capable of either an innocent or a defamatory meaning, or defama-
tory only in light of extrinsic facts or circumstances. 3 Words in the
first class are referred to as libelous per se: words in the latter
class are referred to as libelous per quod. If the words are in the
latter class the plaintiff must allege the defamatory meaning of the
words by an innuendo, and if they are defamatory only in light of
* Instructor, School of Law, The Ohio State University; Member of the
Ohio Bar.
I Cassidy v. Daily Mirror Newspapers, [1929] 2 K.B. 331, 69 A._R. 720.
There appears to be some argument over whether the majority or only a
minority of American courts hold all libel actionable without special dam-
ages. See PaossER, ToRTs § 92 (1941); McCo man, DAMAGES § 113 (1935); 33
Ax. JuR., L3mE Aim SLANDmE § § 5, 243.
2 Davis v. Brown, 27 Ohio St. 326 (1875). In Sexton v. Todd, Wright 316
(1833), it was held slanderous per se to impute unchastity of a woman. To
do such is also a crime in Ohio. Osio REv. CODE § 2901.37. Without going into
the subject very deeply, special damages must be pecuniary in nature, al-
leged with particularity, and arise through and from a lowered reputation due
to the defamatory publication. They must be due to conduct of someone other
than the defamer or defamed and be a proximate result (in the legal sense)
of the defamatory words. See Bigelow v. Brumley, 138 Ohio St. 574, 594, 37
N.E. 2d 584, 594 (1941); Peabody v. Barham, 52 Cal. App. 2d 581, 126 P. 2d 668
(1942); Terwilliger v. Wands, 17 N.Y. 54, 72 Am. Dec. 420 (1858); RESTATE-
m=T, ToRTs § 575 (1938); McComvcx, DA.AGEs § § 113, 114, 115 (1935).
3 33 Am. Jura, L-T. Am SLanERs § 5.
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extrinsic facts or circumstances these too must be set out in an
inducement. 4 Suppose the allegedly libelous words published by the
defendant accuse the plaintiff of marrying his own aunt. If this
charge is understood by its recipients as meaning plaintiff married
his consanguineal aunt then it has carried a defamatory meaning.
If it is understood that plaintiff's wife was his aunt only by her for-
mer marriage then the meaning conveyed was not defamatory but
innocent. The words are capable of either an innocent or a defam-
atory meaning. Plaintiff must allege by innuendo that the words
charged him with marrying his consanguineal aunt; the words
were not libelous per se but libelous per quod. Suppose again that
a newspaper prints that the plaintiff has given birth to twins. There
is nothing defamatory about this statement until an extrinsic fact
is introduced, namely, that the plaintiff has been married only one
month. Plaintiff must allege this fact and that the recipients of the
publication had knowledge of the fact and thus derived a meaning
from the publication defamatory of the plaintiff.6 This would be
done by inducement and innuendo. These two examples illustrate
libel per quod as most courts define it, to be distinguished from a
case of libel per se where the charge is clearly libelous on its face.
Since most courts regard all libels as actionable without a
showing of special damages it does not matter, except from the
procedural standpoint, whether the defamatory words are libel per
se or per quod. Some courts, however, recognize a substantive
difference between the two, requiring allegation and proof of special
damages in case the words are libelous per quod.7 Ohio cases have
repeatedly held that a petition based on words libelous per quod
without an allegation of special damages is subject to demurrer.8
Since special damages must be shown in cases of libel per quod in
Ohio, it becomes important to determine what our courts mean by
the terms libel per se and libel per quod.
An examination of the Ohio cases leads one to the conclusion
that there are two tests often employed to determine the differ-
40Hro ERv. CODE § 2739.01 does not eliminate the need for an inducement
in such a case. Druck v. Kahle, 6 Ohio L. Rep. 648 (1909).
5 Peabody v. Barham, 52 Cal. App. 2d 581, 126 P. 2d 668 (1942).
6 See Morrison v. John Ritchie & Co., 39 Scottish LR. 432, 4 Session Cases
645 (1902).
7 Peabody v. Barhar, 52 Cal. App. 2d 581, 126 P. 2d 668 (1942); Towles v.
Travelers Ins. Co., 282 Ky. 147, 137 S.W. 2d 1110 (1940); Rowan v. Gazette
Printing Co., 74 Mont. 326, 239 Pac. 1035 (1925). See note 1, supra.
8 E.g., Bigelow v. Brumley, 138 Ohio St 574, 37 N.E. 2d 584 (1941);
Sweeney v. Beacon Journal Publishing Co., 66 Ohio App. 475, 35 NE. 2d 471
(1941); Fares v. Vindicator Printing Co., 29 Ohio L. Abs. 452 (1939); Barteck
v. Personal Finance Co., 60 Ohio App. 197, 20 N.E. 2d 259 (1939); Peer v.
Hoiles, 3 Ohio L. Abs. 653 (1925) no facts stated; Cleveland Retail Grocers'
Assn. v. Exton, 18 Ohio Cir. Ct 321, 10 Ohio Cir. Dec. 145 (1899).
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ence between libel per se and libel per quod. The two tests are
not at all similar and although usually the court uses one, ignoring
the other, sometimes it will try to use both tests and it becomes
quite confusing. The first test might well be called the "nature
of the charge" test as it determines whether the charge is libelous
per se or per quod depending upon what the defendant has imputed
to the plaintiff by the words. This test looks at the nature of the
defendant's charge and does not depend upon whether the charge
is carried on the face of the words or is hidden behind them. The
second test used is the one used by most courts elsewhere and
might be called the "need for an innuendo" test. This test, discussed
earlier, requires that the defamatory meaning be carried on the
face of the words and without any need for an innuendo or in-
ducement in order to be libelous per se.
NATURE OF THE CHARGE TEST
As stated before, this test determines what words are libelous
per se on the basis of the seriousness of the act or conduct charged
to the plaintiff and the harm such a charge is calculated to bring the
plaintiff. It appears to be the test more often applied and should
be made clear by a few quotations from leading cases.
A libel in reference to individual injury may be de-
fined to be a false and malicious publication against an
individual, either in print or in writing, or by pictures, with
intent to injure his reputation, and expose him to public
hatred, contempt, or ridicule .... Words of ridicule only,
or of contempt, which merely tend to lessen a man in
public esteem, or to wound his feelings, will support a suit
for libel, because of their being embodied in a more per-
manent and enduring form; of the increased deliberation
and malignity of their publication, and of their tendency
to provoke breaches of the public peace. 9
A libel is a censorious or ridiculing writing, picture,
or sign, made with a mischievous and malicious intent
toward government, magistrates, or individuals. It does
not necessarily charge the plaintiff with a crime, for if its
design be wanton and malicious ridicule, and the tend-
ency of the publication to hold up the plaintiff to the scoffs
and sneers of society; to degrade him and lessen his stand-
ing, an action may well be sustained. So, likewise, if its
tendency will naturally excite to passion and revenge, and
consequent breaches of the peace.'0
... although the matter published might not, without
averment and proof of special damage, be actionable, if
only spoken, yet if published, and it be of a character,
which, if believed, would naturally tend to expose the per-
son concerning whom the same was published, to public
9 Watson v. Trask, 6 Ohio 531, 532 (1834); see Newbraugh v. Curry, Wright
47 (1832).
10 Tappan v. Wilson, 7 Ohio 190, 193 (1835).
19"ii]
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hatred, contempt, or ridicule, or deprive him of the bene-
fits of public confidence or social intercourse, such publi-
cation is a libel, and an action will lie therefor although
no special damage is alleged."
... words written or printed and published, imputing
to another any act, the tendency of which is to disgrace
him, or to deprive him of the confidence and good will of
society, or lessen its esteem for him, are actionable per
se .... 12
To constitute a publication respecting a person libelous
per se, it must appear that the publication reflects upon
the character of such person by bringing him into ridicule,
hatred or contempt, or affects him injuriously in his trade
or profession. 3
These somewhat broad definitions of libel per se might have
been trimmed down a bit in some later court of appeals cases. In
the case of Sweeny v. The Beacon Journal Publishing Co.,14 the
court held words charging the plaintiff, a United States Congress-
man, with blocking the appointment of a United States attorney
to federal court on the basis that the latter was a foreign born Jew
were not libelous per se. The court said in order for words to be
libelous per se they must charge the plaintiff with a violation of
the law of the land or the moral code, and that these words did
not charge any such violation. Although this limitation may be a
wise one in view of the fact that no legal fault is required on the
part of the defendant as far as intent to defame is concerned, there
was little authority for the proposition to be found in our supreme
court cases. It must be admitted, however, that'in many of the
cases in which the supreme court had held words libelous per se
as subjecting the plaintiff to hatred, ridicule, or contempt, they
consisted of charges almost all persons would regard as violations
of the moral code.15 The limitation, if finally approved by the
supreme court, should not cover those charges which are calculated
to injure one in his business or profession, because it is quite
defamatory to write of a merchant that he is insolvent' 6 and yet it
11 State v. Smily, 37 Ohio St. 30, 33 (1881).
12 Id. at 34.
I3 Cleveland Leader Printing Co. v. Nethersole, 84 Ohio St. 118, 95 N.E.
735, Ann. Cas. 1912B 978 (1911).
1466 Ohio App. 475, 35 N.E. 2d 471 (1941). See also Holloway v. Scripps
Publishing Co., 11 Ohio App. 226 (1919); Ohio Public Service Co. v. Myers,
54 Ohio App. 40, 6 NE. 2d 29 (1934).
IS E.g, Newbraugh v. Curry, Wright 47 (1832) perjury; Watson v. Trask, 6
Ohio 531 (1834) wilful patent infringement; Dial v. Holter, 6 Ohio St. 228
(1856) crime of removing corner stone; State v. Smily, 37 Ohio St. 30 (1881)
larceny or receiving stolen goods; Mauk v. Brundage, 68 Ohio St. 89, 67 N.E.
152, 62 L.R.A. 477 (1903) careless child delivery by doctor. This list is far
from being complete.
1 65 See Myerson v. Hurlbut, 98 F. 2d 232 (D. C. Cir. 1938). In G. IYE McKel-
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certainly is not immoral or illegal to become financially embar-
rassed. The court did not so intend to extend the limitation but
confined it to those words which subject the plaintiff to ridicule,
hatred, or contempt.
It is to be noted that in all these definitions of libel per se
the court is concerned with the nature of the charge. Nowhere
do they seem to require that the charge be on the face of the words.
In fact the court often says if the charge is ambiguous it is the
court's function to determine if it is capable of a defamatory mean-
ing and the jury's function to determine if the defamatory mean-
ing was the one conveyed.' 7 One case has specifically stated that
it was the jury's duty to determine if the ambiguous and two-head-
ed charge was libelous per se.' 8 Likewise, this test allows the plain-
tiff to establish that words are libelous per se even when it is
necessary to allege extrinsic facts or circumstances to show the
defamatory meaning conveyed by the words. 9 Therefore the use
of the innuendo or inducement does not prevent words from being
libelous per se.
The result of this test is to put Ohio in accord with the view
that nothing more than a procedural distinction is made between
words clearly defamatory on their face and those capable of two
meanings or defamatory only in light of extrinsic facts. Broadly
stated, those words which subject the plaintiff to hatred, contempt,
or ridicule, or are calculated to injure him in his trade or pro-
fession, are actionable without a showing of special damages
whether the defamatory meaning is carried on their face or is
hidden.
But what does this leave for the action of libel per quod? The
court has said words libelous per quod are actionable upon a show-
ing of special damages. Does this mean those words which subject
the plaintiff to hatred, contempt, or ridicule and yet do not meet
the more rigid test of the Sweeny case? Probably not, because the
action was recognized before this limitation was devised. What
it must mean is that any words which are false and actuated by
malice are actionable if they cause the plaintiff special, pecuniary
damage. It is not necessary that the words be defamatory at all
vey Co. v. Nanson, 5 Ohio App. 73 (1915), the court held it was not libel per se
to print that plaintiff, a tailor, had suddenly retired from business.
1 7 Westropp v. E. W. Scripps Co., 148 Ohio St. 365, 74 N.E. 2d 340 (1947);
State v. Smily, 37 Ohio St. 30 (1881); Culmer v. Canby, 101 Fed. 195 (6th
Cir. 1900); Westropp v. U. W. Scripps Co., 76 Ohio App. 463, 59 N.E. 2d 205
(1944); Foster v. Fesler, 25 Ohio Cir. Ct., N.S., 449 (1916); Bishop v. Cincin-
nati Gazette Co., 7 Ohio Dec. Repr. 711 (1880) affd 6 Ohio Dec. Repr. 1113
(1882).
18 Westropp v. E. W. Scripps Co., 76 Ohio App. 463, 59 N.E. 2d 205 (1944).
19 See Bigelow v. Brumley, 138 Ohio St. 574, 593, 37 N.E. 2d 584, 594 (1941).
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within the usual meaning of the term, because if they are defam-
atory, namely, if they subject the plaintiff to ridicule, hatred, or
contempt, they are actionable per se. And yet we have seen that
the requirement of special damages is that the loss must come from
a lowering of the reputation. Therefore it follows the words must
have been of the type which lowered the plaintiff's reputation,
and if they are, then they should be actionable per se. It is possible
that the usual definition of special damage may have to be changed
for this somewhat strange action of libel per quod, as the present
meaning of special damage was designed for slanderous words not
amounting to slander per se but still defamatory in nature.
Under this "nature of the charge" test the court seems to be
saying that an action will lie for words non-defamatory in nature
which cause the plaintiff special damage and that this action should
be called libel per quod. It may well be that an action should lie
for false and malicious words which cause the plaintiff damage,
but it is confusing to call the action libel per quod. The court seems
to be talking of the old action on the case for intentional harm.2
It should not call the action one of libel, because it is not true that
an action of libel lies for non-defamatory words. The action of libel
lies regardless of the defendant's intention to harm the plaintiff,2 1
but the action for non-defamatory words is an intentional tort. If
the court would admit that what it means by the term libel per so
is the same as what most courts mean by the term "defamatory,"
much of the confusion would disappear. 22
NEED FOR A INNUENDO TEST
There can be found in some Ohio cases language to the effect
that only words clearly defamatory on their face are to be classed
20 "... an action will lie for written or oral falsehoods, not actionable
per se or even defamatory, where they are maliciously published, where they
are calculated in the ordinary course of things to produce, and where they
do produce, actual damage. Such an action is not one of libel or slander
but an action on the case for damage wilfully and intentionally done without
just occasion or excuse .... To support it, actual damage must be shown for
it is an action which only lies in respect of such damage as has actually
occurred." Bowen, L. J., in Ratcliffe v. Evans [1892] 2 Q.B. 524. This is
somewhat analogous to an action for slander of title. See Cleveland Leader
Printing Co. v. Nethersole, 84 Ohio St. 118, 95 N.E. 735, Ann. Cas. 1912B 978
(1911).
21Petransky v. Repository Printing Co., 51 Ohio App. 306, 200 N.E. 647
(1935).
22A rather peculiar, and it is believed erroneous, definition of "defama-
tory" is found in Associated Consumers and Dealers v. Better Business Com-
mission, 3 Ohio L. Abs. 527 (1925), where the court said, "The word defama-
tory means that the language must be such as by a necessary or natural prox-
imate consequence occasions pecuniary loss to him whom it concerns." A
good discussion of the nature of a defamatory meaning by Learned Hand is to
be found in Grant v. Reader's Digest Ass'n., Inc., 151 F. 2d 733 (2d Cir. 1945).
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as libel per se. As stated before, this is the test most courts use
in determining what is libel per se, the only differences being that
many of those courts merely make a procedural distinction between
libel per se and per quod whereas our courts claim to make one of
substance. Sometimes this language has a tendency to confuse
judges attempting to apply the "nature of the charge" test. A court
of appeals case will illustrate this.
In Westropp v. E. W. Scripps Co.,24 the plaintiff claimed she
was libeled by a cartoon in the defendant's newspaper. After either
including or describing the cartoon in the petition, the plaintiff by
innuendo alleged the defamatory meaning of the cartoon. The court
of appeals held that since plaintiff had resorted to explanation by
an innuendo she admitted the ambiguity of the cartoon's meaning
and that reasonable minds might differ as to its meaning. The court
then stated that therefore the language was not libel per se. The
remarkable thing is that then the court submitted the question of
whether or not the cartoon was libel per se to the jury. After
stating the cartoon was not libel per se they said the jury could
find it was. Apparently what was meant was that the court would
not say the cartoon was libelous per se as a matter of law. The
decision really stands for the proposition that ambiguous charges
may be libelous per se although much of the language in the
opinion is to the contrary.
A more recent case, Westropp v. E. W. Scripps Co., involving
the same parties, will illustrate the division in Ohio over which
test is to be employed. The plaintiff set out the allegedly libelous
article in full and then, again, resorted to an innuendo to allege
its defamatory meaning. The defendant had a verdict below, af-
firmed by the court of appeals, and plaintiff appealed to the su-
preme court arguing that the trial court erred in not instructing
the jury that the article was libelous per se. The supreme court
split four and three. Two dissenting judges felt that the judgment
for the defendant should be sustained on the ground that the peti-
tion merely stated a case of libel per quod and no special damages
had been alleged or proved. They felt it was libel per quod because
the words were ambiguous and plaintiff had resorted to an in-
nuendo to explain their meaning. They said, "It is the duty of the
court to determine whether the published words are actionable
per se and to instruct the jury accordingly. If there is any doubt
about it, that is, if the meaning is ambiguous, the publication is
23 Johnson v. Campbell, 91 Ohio App. 483, 108 NE. 2d 749 (1952); Westropp
v. EL W. Scripps Co., 76 Ohio App. 463, 59 N.R. 2d 205 (1944); Commercial
Gazette Co. v. Grooms, 21 Wkly. L. Bull. 292 (1889); Settlage v. Kampf, 10
Ohio Dec. Repr. 822, 19 Wkly. L. Bull. 321 (1888).
24 76 Ohio App. 463, 59 N.E. 2d 205 (1944).
ZS 148 Ohio St. 365, 74 N.E. 2d 340 (1947).
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
not actionable per se."20 A majority of the court, however, felt the
trial court erred in not instructing the jury that the words were
libelous per se, not because such is never a jury question, but be-
cause the publication in the case was unequivocally libelous per se,
and plaintiff's innuendo could be disregarded as unnecessary. The
court said, "It is well settled that in an action for libel the question
whether the publication complained of is libelous per se is primar-
ily for the court, and that it is error to submit to the jury the
question whether the publication is libelous per se, unless its mean-
ing is so uncertain and ambiguous as to require that the construc-
tion and meaning be submitted to the jury. '2 7 The court further
said that in determining whether the words are libelous per se ref-
erence should be made to the circumstances under which they
were used. The court thereby rejected the test which looks only to
the words themselves in determining whether they are libel per se.
The third dissenting judge agreed that the question of libel per se
can be a jury question and that since the jury returned a verdict
for the defendant they evidently found the publication not libel
per se. This judge thought that since plaintiff had used an innuendo,
and thereby admitted the words were ambiguous, the question was
properly submitted to the jury.
Thus it can be seen that a majority of the supreme court in
1947 applied the "nature of the charge" test and did not confine it
to the face of the words. Two of the judges applied the "need for'
an innuendo" test, perhaps broadening it into a "use of an in-
nuendo" test. Two of the five judges who used the "nature of the
charge" test and one who used the "need for an innuendo" test are
no longer on the court, and so it cannot be said with any great
certainty which test will be applied in the future. One does not
get the impression from reading the Westropp case that the ques-
tion has been completely settled.
26Id. at 380, 74 N.E. 2d at 348.
27 Id. at 373, 74 N.E. 2d at 345.
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